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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JENNIFER ELIZABETH SAGERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48590-2021
Ada County Case No.
CR01-20-29099
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Sagers failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
when it imposed a unified 10-year sentence with three years fixed upon Sagers’ plea to attempted
robbery?
ARGUMENT
Sagers Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
In July 2020, Jennifer Sagers approached a

woman outside of an Idaho Youth

Ranch in Eagle. (PSI, p.1-2 1’; Tr., p.17, Ls.1-5.) The woman was at the Youth Ranch to drop
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Citations to page numbers of the PSI refer to the page numbers of the electronic file containing
the PSI and other documents.
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off some donated items. (PSI, pp.1-2.) Sagers approached the woman and asked if she had a
phone charger that she could borrow, because, she explained, she was stranded and her cell
phone was out of power. (PSI, p.2.) The woman handed Sagers a charger and allowed her to
charge her phone inside of the woman’s vehicle while she unloaded her donated items. (Id.)
The woman left her purse inside the trunk of her vehicle. (Id.)
When the woman returned from dropping off the donated items, she noticed that the
trunk of her vehicle was open and that her purse was missing. (Id.) The woman saw Sagers
walking way with a grocery cart containing plastic bins. (Id.) The woman, believing that Sagers
had stolen her purse, confronted her. (Id.) The woman responded to Sagers, “I’ll kill you if you
don’t back off I don’t have your fucking purse.” (Id.) The woman, assuming that her purse was
inside one of the plastic bins from the grocery card, grabbed the bin. (Id.) Sagers then grabbed
the woman’s head and struck her on the asphalt. (Id.) Sagers also took a lighter and tried to set
the woman’s hair on fire. (Id.) The woman said to Sagers, “You’re going to kill me aren’t you?”
(Id.) The woman tried to run away from Sagers, but Sagers pulled her to the ground and struck
her head on the curb. (PSI, p.3.) The attack stopped when a vehicle’s headlights illuminated the
parking lot. (Id.) Sagers threw the woman’s purse down and left the area on foot. (Id.)
The woman went to a hospital where she was interviewed by police. (PSI, pp.1-3.) The
woman told the responding officer that her debit card and approximately $180-200 dollars of
cash were taken from her purse. (PSI, p.3.) The officer noticed that the woman had a small
scratch on the right side of her chin and marks on her right forearm. (PSI, p.2.) Sagers left her
cell phone at the scene of the attack. (PSI, p.3.) The phone had a piece of tape with her name
attached to it. (Id.) The woman identified Sagers as her attacker through Facebook photos and a
police photo lineup. (PSI, pp.209-210, 214.)
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The state charged Sagers with attempted robbery 2 and aggravated battery. (R., pp.29-30.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Sagers pled guilty to attempted robbery, and the state
agreed to dismiss the aggravated battery charge, and to dismiss charges in two separate criminal
cases, Ada County Cases CR01-20-6054 and CR01-20-11358. (R., pp.35, 41; Tr., p.5, L.21 –
p.21, L.4.) At the sentencing hearing, noting the violent nature of the attack and Sagers’
extensive criminal history, the state recommended a unified 15-year sentence with four years
fixed. (Tr., p.25, L.7 – p.33, L.16.) Sagers recommended a unified five-year sentence with two
years fixed.

(Tr., p.33, L.21 – p.37, L.13.)

The district court fell between these

recommendations and imposed a unified 10-year sentence with three years fixed. (R., pp.50-52;
Tr., p.39, L.16 – p.44, L.1.) Sagers timely appealed. (R., pp.56-58.)
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering

the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). The abuse of
discretion test looks to whether the district court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
2

The charging information identifies Count I as “Robbery”, but cites to I.C. § 18-306, the
criminal attempt statute. (R., p.29.) At the change of plea hearing, Sagers specifically entered a
guilty plea to “attempted robbery.” (Tr., p.20, Ls.10-12.)
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the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194
(2018).
C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Id. at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895-96, 392
P.3d 1228, 1236-37 (2017) (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628
(2015)). It is well established that the primary sentencing consideration is protection of society,
and that all other factors must be subservient to that end. State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 627,
873 P.2d 877, 881 (1994).
The district court recognized the seriousness of Sagers’ conduct, and, while not fully
following the state’s recommendation, imposed a significant unified sentence of 10 years with
three years fixed. (R., pp.50-52; Tr., p.39, L.16 – p.44, L.1.) A review of the record supports the
court’s sentencing determination.
The nature of the crime warranted the sentence imposed. Sagers told the presentence
investigator and the district court that due to some unresolved anger she was having a “bad day”
and wanted to “pick a fight.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.11-17; PSI, p.4.) Sagers chose as her victim a
woman who was trying to donate items to charity and who agreed to let Sagers borrow a
4

phone charger. (PSI, pp.1-3.) As the district court fairly recognized (Tr., p.43, Ls.8-16), Sagers’
unprovoked criminal acts committed against a woman that she did not know demonstrated a
particular danger to the general public. Sagers’ actions went beyond mere theft, but included
completed violent acts that resulted in her victim going to the hospital, and an attempted violent
act of trying to set the victim’s hair on fire. (PSI, pp.1-3.)
The incident was not an isolated occurrence, but instead was the latest chapter in Sagers’
lengthy criminal history. After amassing an extensive record of drug and theft offenses as a
juvenile (PSI, pp.11-13), Sagers obtained three felony convictions and six misdemeanor
convictions, including for possession of a controlled substance, battery, harboring a felon, two
convictions for driving under the influence, and two convictions for robbery (PSI, pp.14-15). In
addition to this prior record, by the time of her change of plea hearing in the present case, Sagers
had three other pending felony cases - Ada County Case No. CR01-20-6054, involving a theft
from Walmart; Ada County Case No. CR01-20-11358, involving drug possession and the theft
of a financial transaction card; and Canyon County Case No. CR14-20-10055, involving a theft
from Sportsman’s Warehouse. (PSI, p.14-15, 254-266, 307-317; Tr., p.25, L.23 – p.26, L.12.)
Sagers’ criminal record also reflects failures to comply with the terms of probation and
parole, and even of the jails she was housed in. While on felony probation in 2018, Sagers was
the subject of a report of probation violation alleging that she moved without permission,
knowingly harbored a fugitive, and left her assigned district. (PSI, p.15; Tr., p.29, L.3 – p.30,
L.1.) Prior to that, she absconded from parole in California. (PSI, pp.14, 15; Tr., p.28, Ls.2024.) While in jail pending her sentencing hearing in this case, Sagers made threats to another
inmate, causing the other inmate to be moved to different housing. (PSI, p.42.)
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On appeal, Sagers contends that her sentence was excessive in light of certain mitigating
factors, including her substance abuse issues, mental health issues, poor physical health, and
difficult childhood.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-9.)

However, these factors were extensively

referenced in the presentence investigation report, and there is no indication in the record that the
district court failed to consider any of them. To the contrary, the district court expressly
referenced these mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing. (See e.g., Tr., p.40, L.20 – p.42,
L.15; p.42, L.25 – p.43, L.7.) The district court also ordered that an I.C. § 19-2522 mental health
evaluation be conducted prior to sentencing (R., pp.47-48), and then, at the sentencing hearing
itself, the court specifically referenced this evaluation and noted that it was helpful to it in
making its sentencing determination (Tr., p.41, Ls.16-18). Clearly, the district court was aware
of, and considered, the ample information contained in the presentence investigation report.
Ultimately, however, the court reasonably concluded that the “risk of future violent harm to other
people” posed by Sagers warranted a significant sentence. (Tr., p.42, Ls.16-21.)
Further, while, as Sagers notes on appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5), substance abuse can
be a mitigating factor at sentencing, it can also be an aggravating factor. State v. Garcia, 166
Idaho 661, 680, 462 P.3d 1125, 1144 (2020). Here, the district court properly recognized that
Sagers’ drug addiction was a factor underlying the risk of theft and violence she posed to the
community. (Tr., p.42, Ls.16-21.) Sagers, who was unemployed, spent $250 to $500 a week on
controlled substances, and told jail staff that she was detoxing from alcohol, heroin, and
methamphetamine. (PSI, pp.8-9, 360.) It is thus a fair inference that Sagers’ multiple charged
thefts in 2020 were motivated at least in part by a need to obtain money to support her
addictions.
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Sagers LSI-R score was 40, well above the 31+ threshold for women indicating a “high”
recidivism risk. (PSI, pp.15-16.) Noting Sagers’ extensive criminal history; lack of stable
housing, employment, or a support system; and Sagers’ own acknowledgment that she was not a
good candidate for probation, the presentence investigator recommended a period of
incarceration. (PSI, p.17.)
In light of all of the factors discussed above, the district court acted well within its
discretion to impose a unified 10-year sentence with three years fixed upon Sagers’ conviction
for attempted robbery. Sagers has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court abused
its sentencing discretion. This Court should affirm the judgment of conviction.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the sentencing determination of the
district court.
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2021.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of September, 2021, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
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/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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